A. Y. DRUGOV
Doctor of Political Science
February 2010 marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our country and Indonesia, now the fourth most populous country in the world. Celebrating such dates, it is customary to turn primarily to the emotional sphere, focusing on long-standing traditions, primordial feelings of friendship and respect, etc. But if we leave aside this undoubtedly important aspect of our relations with Indonesia, and look at the roots of these traditions and feelings, then we find similarities, closeness or even coincidence of national interests or at least their vision.
And we will not absolutize the fact that the dominant ideologies in the two countries came to the fore from one side or another, at one time or another. In the end, state ideologies are a kind of generalization of the state interest, which is accepted as national.
In the last 4 decades, the phrase that relations between our two countries "experienced ups and downs"has become popular. (In Indonesian, this sounds not only more poetic - "ebb and flow" - but also more accurate in its own way, reflecting the behavior of the sea as a constantly present subject that obeys objective laws and processes.)
BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS
When Indonesians, like the peoples of other colonies, gained independence after World War II, they were sure, according to the country's first president, Dr. Sukarno, that they were stepping on the "golden bridge" leading to equality and prosperity at home and its dignified and equal position on the world stage.
This confidence was soon shattered by the harsh reality that the world was divided into two camps, the mutual hostility of which was a kind of fusion of ideology and geopolitics. The new countries of the East entered this world not so much as equal subjects of international communication, but as objects of the struggle of two blocs for influence.
The position of the Soviet Union in a certain sense had significant advantages. Without being a colonial power and acting in accordance with the state ideology and political doctrine against imperialism and colonialism, the Soviet country could unconditionally support the emerging nations and peoples in their confrontation with the former colonialists, who at the same time were mostly opponents of the USSR in the beginning of the cold War.
Washington was in a more difficult position: in its anti-colonial escapades, the US administration was limited, in particular, by allied relations with recent colonizers. In addition, the East suspected, not without reason, that the Americans intended to take the place of the old "masters".
But there were at least two vulnerabilities in the situation of the Soviet Union: the offensive nature of the official ideology, which in its social and philosophical aspects was viewed with suspicion both in patriarchal and religious circles, which made up the most influential and numerous part of the population of the former colonies, and in a very narrow layer of the Westernized elite, as well as the inability to compete with the West in providing economic assistance to new countries.
As applied to Indonesia, we note that the Soviet Union, through its representatives in the UN, consistently supported the Indonesian Republican government, which in 1945-1949 waged an anti-colonial war against the Netherlands. At the same time, in the first years of the Republic's existence, the attitude of Indonesian leaders to the development of relations with the USSR was ambiguous. We should agree with the opinion of Professor L. M. Efimova, who notes that the Indonesian government took a very cautious position on this issue, fearing to damage contacts with the United States and England, which it counted on to help in the confrontation with Holland. 1
By this time, the Soviet leadership had already matured to understand that the post-war wave of socialist revolutions in both Europe and Asia had passed its peak and that the Soviet Union in the East would in most cases have to deal with national-bourgeois regimes. When December 27, 1949 Indonesia and the Netherlands have reached an agreement on the establishment of an independent state of the United States of Indonesia, the Government of the USSR on-
After some hesitation, the new state was recognized on January 25, 1950.
I. V. Stalin's recommendations to the new leadership of the Communist Party of Indonesia, sent in January 1951, also testify to this. The key point in them was the advice to abandon the left-wing phrase and turn "towards practical, molecular, "dirty" work on the daily needs of workers, peasants, and the working intelligentsia"2. Apparently, the Soviet leadership came to the conclusion: if not Sukarno personally, then, in any case, the leadership of the nationalist movement, which he personifies, has become firmly established in Indonesia seriously and for a long time.
After the resignation in 1952 of the cabinet of the right-wing Muslim leader Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo, who tried to conclude an agreement on mutual security with the United States, the Indonesian leadership has shifted towards a clearly expressed national-power orientation in politics, rooted in the history of medieval states on the territory of the archipelago. Hence the increasingly clear desire of the most influential segments of the Indonesian elite to distance themselves from the great power blocs, which coincided with the mood of the broader population. In a statement issued by the Cabinet, which came to power in May 1952, it was stated that "in matters concerning the contradictions between the blocs ... the Government reserves the freedom of action, taking into account (1) its view of the goals of Indonesia as a conscientious and consistent Member of the United Nations and (2) state and national interests both in the immediate and long-term, and in the longer term. " 3
This course, called an active and independent foreign policy in Indonesia, involved renouncing defensive treaties with states that were part of military blocs, and at the same time maximizing the use of contradictions between Washington and Moscow and the military blocs as a whole. In addition, as the Vice-President of Indonesia M. Hatta frankly wrote at the time, " a policy that would lead to Indonesia joining one of the blocs would complicate the internal situation and prevent the consolidation of forces in the country."4.Under strong pressure from the Indonesian Parliament, an exchange of embassies between Indonesia and the USSR took place in late 1953 and early 1954.
Thus, the mid-1950s not only reflects landmark events in relations between the USSR and Indonesia, but also reflects certain qualitative changes in the political thinking of the leaders of the two countries. For the Soviet leaders of the post-Stalin era, this meant consolidating the seeds of greater ideological and political pluralism in the formation and implementation of relations with the outside world in general and with the liberated nations in particular.
The concept of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, which becomes the theoretical basis of the USSR's foreign policy, was organically combined with the help of new states in the struggle for an equal position on the world stage and overcoming the remnants of the colonial past in relations with former metropolises. In this situation, Asia, Africa and Latin America have become the arena of struggle between political, economic and, indirectly, in some cases, military blocs. Without abandoning the vision of socialism and communism as the common future of all mankind and the international communist movement and the socialist camp as the vanguard and bulwark of peace and progress, the CPSU theorists gradually come to the conclusion that there are many forms of ways of transition to a classless society. This approach (which will soon give rise, in particular, to the concept of a non-capitalist way of developing new states) was intended to open up greater ideological freedom in cooperation with countries outside the socialist camp, and to expand the limits of this cooperation.
Among Indonesian leaders, their radical nationalist wing led by Sukarno, the vision of their country as one of the leaders and architects of the community of Eastern countries that will soon be called the "third world", and Sukarno will call "new emerging forces", is also being established during this period. The President of Indonesia won a major political victory, becoming one of the main ideologists of the Conference of Asian and African States, held in April 1955 in the Indonesian city of Bandung. This conference is like a constitution-
It recognized the liberated states of Asia and Africa as sovereign subjects of world politics. It approved 10 principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. Bandung thus became a kind of forerunner of the Conference of European States in Helsinki in 1975.
The Soviet leadership recognized this reality earlier than the West. Welcoming messages from the chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviets of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were sent to the Bandung Conference.
In Washington, whose foreign policy was largely determined by Secretary of State J. F. Dulles, who had a black-and-white vision of the world, he saw attempts by Asian and African countries to distance themselves from both Cold War camps as a move to the side of the United States ' enemies. In fact, a prominent Russian Indonesian scholar and diplomat, Yu. A. Sholmov, was right when he wrote that " in Bandung, for the first time, the trend towards creating a multipolar structure of the future world found its real embodiment."5
In this situation, the leadership of the Soviet Union, while taking certain steps to normalize and develop its own relations with the countries of the West, at the same time considered the East as a separate field of geopolitical competition between the two systems and reasonably saw significant advantages and prospects for themselves, taking into account, in particular, the deep anti-colonial legacy in the political psychology of Africa.
President Sukarno, for his part, has genuinely tried to maintain a balance in his relations with both blocs. He began his" mega-tour " of foreign countries in 1956 with the United States, where he persistently tried to convince the Washington elite that his anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism did not equate with anti-Americanism and pro-communist orientation (and this was absolutely true). In vain.
The reception given to the Indonesian head of state in Moscow was the exact opposite. Sukarno was honored "at the highest level", not skimping on signs of respect for him personally and his country, giving the opportunity to travel around almost half of the USSR and, what was especially important for him, repeatedly perform in front of mass audiences. In a sense, 1956 was a turning point in relations between the USSR and Indonesia. Both parties have found their place in the partner's interests and the partner's place in their own interests. For Sukarno, it became clear that the Kremlin was willing to go far enough in cooperation with Indonesia, including such a burning issue at that time as the return to the Republic of the western part of the island of New Guinea, which was illegally held by the Netherlands after they recognized the sovereignty of the former Dutch India in 1949. For the Indonesian national leadership, the situation with West Irian (as this territory was called in the Republic) was also an occasion to maintain the priority of national interests and goals against the background of growing internal social and economic problems.
It was an opportunity for the Soviet leadership to demonstrate the USSR's commitment to the cause of the anti-imperialist struggle under exceptionally favorable conditions: The Dutch position was extremely unpopular in the countries of the East, and this tied the hands of its NATO allies in the event of an escalating conflict. Washington chose a deliberately losing option. By continually accusing Sukarno of slipping into communism, the Americans made the fatal mistake of supporting, along with Britain, the separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1957-1958. As in almost any other country, an attempt on its territorial integrity is a mortal sin in the eyes of the vast majority of Indonesians, regardless of their political orientation. Already in the mid-1990s, an Indonesian diplomat said to the author of these lines:"Mark my words: neither the Indonesian armed forces nor all Indonesians will ever forget that the United States tried to promote the dismemberment of Indonesia." (It is characteristic that my interlocutor himself in those distant times was hardly out of infancy.)
Under these circumstances, the Indonesian government turned to Moscow for help. On January 5, 1958, the Indonesian side was informed that the Soviet Union was in solidarity with the struggle of the Indonesian people for reunification with West Irian, and the Soviet Government was ready to favorably consider concrete proposals for the purchase of a new nuclear power plant.
USSR military equipment and armaments 6.
The military-technical cooperation between the USSR and Indonesia that began in this way played a special role in the development of relations between the two countries, and this role was multifaceted. At the expense of Soviet supplies, the Indonesian land army, aviation and navy were radically re-equipped, and in some cases the received combat equipment for 2 - 3 generations (fighters, bombers, radar systems, air defense systems, etc.) exceeded the weapons available in Indonesia by the end of the 1950s. and consisted mainly of from samples from the Second World War. This required the retraining of many thousands of Indonesian military personnel, conducted by Soviet military specialists both in educational institutions of the USSR and in Indonesia itself.
BROTHERS IN ARMS
The culmination of military-technical and political cooperation was the consent of the USSR leadership to the participation of Soviet military personnel in large-scale military operations for the liberation of West Irian, which Sukarno and his military leaders planned for August 1962. These events are described in a number of articles and other publications, of which the most reliable to me as their direct participant (the author of these lines was in 1962 - 1964. translation officer of the headquarters of the group of Soviet military specialists in Indonesia) presents the already cited work of Yu. A. Sholmov, then Consul General in Surabaya, as well as articles by Vice Admiral G. K. Chernobai, who headed the activities of Soviet military specialists in Indonesia at that time, and Captain 1st Rank E. K. Chubshev, then Consul General in Surabaya. pore Assistant Naval Attache of the USSR in Indonesia 7.
I remember how the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Marshal of Aviation K. A. Vershinin, who arrived in Jakarta in July 1962, said to us officers:"On behalf of the Minister of Defense, I order you to act in the event of combat operations as if protecting the borders of the USSR." Dozens of ships and planes with Soviet crews returned to their original positions along with the Indonesian forces, but on August 15, a few hours before the hour of "H", the command "stand down"was received.
The Dutch surrendered without resistance.
In recent years, several "alarmist" articles have appeared in the media, where the Soviet leadership was accused of adventurism, which put the world almost on the brink of world War II. The article by A. Zhdankin, published in the magazine "MIC", was entitled "Three hours before the Third World War"8. This author speaks from positions dictated by either political obsession, or lack of awareness, or the interests of cheap sensationalism. (For the readers ' judgment, we leave the author's completely wild claim that Soviet sailors were treated to human meat in Indonesia.)
As I later had to see, the order to start combat operations was taken seriously at the level of performers. The political leadership of both countries proceeded from the fact that the Dutch alone would not go to a military clash, and NATO, first of all, the new administration of J. R. R. Tolkien. Kennedy, who has made a sharp U-turn towards a flexible approach to the "third world", will not get involved in the conflict. Kennedy initiated the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations with the mediation of the American diplomat E. Bunker. As a result, it was agreed that the Indonesian flag would be raised in West Irian no later than October 1, 1962. The military operation was canceled.
Both Soviet and Indonesian leaders got what they wanted: Indonesia achieved its declared national goal by restoring its territorial integrity. The Soviet Union demonstrated its political and military potential (however, it must be admitted that the Indonesian side kept silent about Soviet assistance and formally it was not recognized by either side at that time, although it was not a secret to anyone). Moscow has confirmed its solidarity with the" third world " and gained significant moral and political potential in the public consciousness of Indonesians and, in particular, in the Indonesian armed forces. At the same time, Washington finds itself in the position of an ally that cannot always be trusted.
The fact that a number of joint Soviet-Indonesian economic projects, including the construction of superphosphate and steel mills, and a number of others, did not actually move forward (there was not enough funding from the Indonesian side), caused alarm in Moscow, but the Soviet side was unable to change anything, since Indonesia was in the foreground there were still political projects and campaigns. Sukarno once said, "The prime minister of a foreign power once said to me,' How can your country exist without a strong industry?' Excuse me, but I will say: how stupid this Prime Minister is! He thinks that the life of a nation depends on the technical level of the country, on its industry. No, sir! The life of a nation depends on the love of freedom of that nation, and the life of the revolution depends on the revolutionary consciousness of the nation making the revolution. Not from industry, not from factories, planes, or paved roads."9. There is reason to believe that the unnamed interlocutor was N. S. Khrushchev.
In relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia, since the late 1950s, there have been differences in the approach to such a fundamental issue as the peaceful coexistence of the two social groups.
and political systems, two camps led by the USSR and the USA. And it wasn't the romantic anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism of Jakarta's leaders, who had emerged from the War of independence just 10 years earlier. Sukarno's foreign policy was largely based on the game of contradictions between the two giants (however, Indonesia was not alone in this sense), and the Indonesian leadership did not believe that a far-reaching rapprochement would meet the country's own interests.
Already in 1963, a new problem became a touchstone for Soviet-Indonesian relations-plans to create a Federation of Malaysia near the borders of Indonesia with the inclusion of the former British colonies-the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei.
Sukarno had some reason to be wary of these plans, bearing in mind that it was from Malaya that the Indonesian separatists received aid in the 1950s. But domestic political considerations prompted him to look in the face of the new state for the image of the enemy against whom the nation could rally, presenting the creation of the Federation as a threat to national security and getting a pretext for launching first political and then sabotage actions of Indonesia against the new state. Sukarno's far-reaching goal was to establish his country as the leader and beacon of the struggle of the liberated nations against neo-colonialism and imperialism. From a legal, political, military, and moral point of view, this campaign was doomed to failure.
It was obvious that unlike West Irian, the West would not allow Indonesia to win. International support for Sukarno, including in the East, was minimal. The Soviet leadership, while not publicly condemning this campaign, made it clear that it was by no means ready to support Jakarta's policy as strongly as it was a year earlier. The worst role in this situation was played by the Maoist leadership of China, which persistently declared its far-reaching support for Sukarno's anti-Malaysian campaign and tried to prove that the CPSU "betrayed" the ideals of the anti-imperialist struggle.
Under these conditions, 1964 marked a period of a certain cooling of Soviet-Indonesian relations against the background of growing internal contradictions in Indonesia itself. This cooling off was caused not only by different approaches to the Malaysian problem, but also by Moscow's overall unwillingness to meet the not always realistic, sometimes messianic, foreign policy concepts and projects put forward by Indonesian leaders and, above all, by Sukarno himself.
Among other things, the USSR was dissatisfied with the fact that these concepts underestimated the role of the socialist camp and, accordingly, the Soviet Union in world politics and overly emphasized the importance of the "third world" (by that time far from unified in its political orientation).
in opposition to imperialism. Moreover, in a number of speeches, Sukarno said that the Indonesian revolution was more important in terms of its global significance than the War of independence in America and the October Revolution in Russia - an escapade that could not but cause irritation in Moscow.
A negative role was also played by the fact that many of Jakarta's actions, which were demonstratively supported in Beijing, were fairly or unfairly viewed in Moscow through the prism of the Soviet-Chinese contradictions, which created additional psychological and political difficulties. All this was compounded by ideological differences between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Indonesia, the largest Communist party in the non-socialist world, whose leadership sided with the Chinese Communist Party on a number of important issues.
BALANCING ON THE EDGE
The political crisis that broke out in Indonesia in the fall
1965, ended with a coup d'etat that brought to power the military-authoritarian regime of the so-called new order, and was accompanied by unprecedented mass and brutal repression of Indonesian communists. The death toll, according to some estimates, reached 2 million. Anti-communism has become an essential part of the ideology and politics of the "new order". The fact that, under the circumstances, it was directed primarily against China did not remove the most serious problems and responsibilities that the USSR faced as the leading country of the socialist camp and the CPSU, in which most of the world's Communist parties saw their leader.
The problem facing the Soviet leadership, in fact, was to find a way to combine sufficiently far-reaching solidarity with fellow ideologues (even if they were partly "lost") with efforts to maintain diplomatic and political contacts with the new regime in Indonesia, which, apparently, came to power in earnest and for a long time in this country. a country that then ranked 5th in the world in terms of population and, in addition, owed the Soviet Union almost $1 billion. for military and other supplies.
As for the Indonesian side, the main part of the Indonesian elite - military and civilian-under all conditions did not believe that Indonesia was called to follow in the wake of a particular state or a bloc of states, including Western ones. Indonesia should have had sufficient freedom of maneuver in its relations with the outside world. And in order for foreign policy independence not to remain a mere declaration, Jakarta needed to maintain at least a minimal level of ties with the USSR and its allies (as for China, ties with Beijing were "frozen" in 1967).
Since the end of 1965, a broad campaign of solidarity with the Indonesian Communists was launched in Moscow in the form of statements by the Central Committee of the CPSU, public organizations,and numerous publications in the periodical press. 10
In general, relations between the two countries until about the mid-1980s resembled walking a very fine line between the objective, rather than contrived, need to follow their own ideological guidelines, fulfill international obligations (the latter primarily related to the USSR) and take into account the strategic perspective, long-term political and geopolitical interests. The Soviet position, to paraphrase a well-known statement, could be formulated as follows: "Regimes come and go, but the Indonesian people and the Indonesian state remain."
In Indonesia, the need to maintain at least a semblance of balance in politics has been the subject of a serious internal political struggle.
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975 and annexation of the territory drew official condemnation in the USSR, as in most countries of the world, but Jakarta perceived this position of Moscow as natural and was more offended by the" betrayal " of the West, since this action took place with the help of American weapons and the actual consent of the US Secretary of State. Kissinger 11.
The position of Indonesia in connection with the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was indicative. It seems that the official condemnation of this action by the Indonesian side was characterized by a certain internal restraint. It was explained, in our opinion, by the unwillingness to activate radical Islam both inside and outside the country, even if on an anti-Soviet, anti-communist basis.
As economic development brought Indonesia to the level of an agrarian-industrial country, Indonesian society, including the ruling military and bureaucratic elite, could increasingly afford to claim an important role in world affairs and, in particular, in Southeast Asia (SE).
Its position in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was de facto dominant, although it was never formally recognized. Nationalism, painted in clearly distinguishable great-power colors, has always been the alpha and omega of Indonesian foreign policy (another thing is that at certain stages the situation forced it to be veiled). National pride suffered, in particular, from the control of international financial institutions and creditor countries, from criticism of the human rights situation, which was both fair and pharisaical, since it often came from countries that had once shown a willingness to forgive and support any atrocities in Indonesia in order to end the real or imaginary left-wing threat.
THE OLD "LOVE" DOES NOT RUST
The period of perestroika in the Soviet Union created certain opportunities for both sides to make further adjustments in their diplomacy. When the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev needed a podium in 1987 to publicize his Asian security agenda, an interview with the publisher of the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, B. M. Diah, one of the oldest and most prominent figures in the Indonesian national press, was used.
In 1989, President Suharto visited Moscow and held talks with the Soviet leadership, an event that would have seemed improbable even 10 years earlier. The mood in the Indonesian political elite at that time can be judged from the memoirs of K. N. Brutentz, who in the summer of 1991, as an adviser to the President of the USSR, participated in the Soviet delegation to the ASEAN session in Jakarta. He writes that Indonesian and Malaysian statesmen persistently complained to the Soviet representatives about the American diktat and expressed an extreme interest in making sure that the United States was able to do so. -
"nothing happened" to the Soviet Union, and they talked about the unacceptability of Washington's hegemony, which can only be counterbalanced by Moscow. It is noteworthy that one of the interlocutors was Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, and the other was one of the architects of Indonesia's economic development, Radius Prawiro, who in the USSR was considered an apologist for the Western liberal school and Indonesia's orientation to the West. He was one of those who insisted on inviting the Soviet delegation to the ASEAN session, despite pressure from the United States12.
Even many hardline anti-communists in Indonesia (and elsewhere) saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical catastrophe that, as it seemed at the time, inevitably led to the creation of a unipolar world.13
In the conditions that developed in connection with the weakening and then collapse of the USSR, the US policy towards Indonesia became more and more offensive. According to former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the Americans were adamant that Indonesia move to democracy, stop human rights abuses and start a war on corruption. According to Goh Chok Tong, Lee Kuan Yew's successor as prime minister, who met with Suharto in February 1998, the latter believed that the West had decided to overthrow him.14
In 1991, Washington imposed an embargo on the supply of military equipment to this country in connection with the actions of the Indonesian army against supporters of the independence of East Timor, annexed, again, by Indonesia in 1975 with the consent of Secretary of State H. Kissinger. Indonesia was frankly made to understand that it was seen primarily as one of the figures in the Cold War and it lost its significance with the fall of the USSR.
Indonesia, following Malaysia, broke the almost complete monopoly of the West in the technical equipment of the national armed forces. Back in 1997, the Suharto government signed an agreement on the supply of Russian aviation equipment totaling about $1 billion, including 12 Su-30K fighters and 8 Mi-17 helicopters 15. (Due to the financial and economic crisis that began in the same year, the implementation of this agreement had to be postponed for a while.)
There was a widespread perception among Indonesians that the West, and especially the United States, did not want their country's political role and economic independence to be strengthened, and many were inclined to attribute this to the economic and then political crisis that led to the fall of the military-authoritarian regime in May 1998. that they bear a significant share of the blame for the negative processes in the Indonesian economy. As Laksamana Sukardi, Indonesia's Minister of state-owned enterprise Management, later said, " international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, analysts from investment banks and insurance companies have compiled laudatory reports about what Suharto and his technocrats were doing, and that Indonesia is capable of becoming at least a junior among the tigers of East Asia, and international auditors have tested false financial statements... They gave loans, supported, approved, and covered what was happening in order to receive dividends and strengthen their positions in order to receive new, even more profitable contracts or orders for consulting services. " 16
The process of globalization was initially perceived by the Indonesian political elite as a threat to the country's internal structure and foreign policy positions. This was primarily due to the fact that after 1991 globalization was organically associated with the formation of a unipolar system of international relations. Although post-Soviet Russia's ability to counteract these trends was significantly weaker than that of the Soviet Union, it is nevertheless in our country that Jakarta, as the new Russia grew stronger, saw and sees a counterbalance to the growing dominance of Washington. Thus, President of Indonesia A. Wahid at a meeting with Vladimir Putin during the session of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2000 thanked the head of the Russian state for not bowing his head to the United States17.
A legitimate question may arise: why are hopes pinned on Russia in this situation? After all, China already in the late 1990s had at least as much potential and ability to resist unipolar trends.
The answer to this question, in our opinion, sheds light on the fundamental factor underlying relations between Russia and Indonesia. In short, they are not afraid of us in this country. (As the Chinese say in such cases:"Be friends with the far, be at enmity with the near.") No matter how far cooperation between the two countries goes in the political, military-technical or economic fields, Russia by definition does not and cannot acquire levers for great-power pressure on Jakarta. This, from the point of view of Indonesia's national interests, is our advantage over the PRC, and hence the preference given to Russia, including in cases where Jakarta wants to put pressure on the West, showing that Western countries, primarily the United States, do not always have a monopoly on certain products. other areas of cooperation.
This tactic is generally successful. In 2008, the Bush administration lifted the embargo on almost all areas of military-technical cooperation with Indonesia. The formal argument in favor of such a decision was the democratic transformation carried out in Indonesia over the past decade. But the main reason is different. Washington is seeking to involve the armed forces of this country with the largest Muslim population in the world in the fight against international terrorism. The Indonesian government, which is facing the problem of-
The United States is actively promoting terrorism in its own country, and seeks to distance itself from its internationalization as much as possible, fearing that too far-reaching cooperation with the United States in this area will cause rejection in the country's Muslim community.
Since 2003, there have been two visits by the President of Indonesia to the Russian Federation and a return visit by the Head of the Russian State.
During the visit of President M. Sukarnoputri to Moscow in April 2003, a Declaration on the Foundations of friendly and Partnership Relations between the two countries in the XXI century was signed. The document confirmed the intention to contribute to the establishment of a just and stable world order based on shared responsibility and recognition of the primacy of the principles of multilateralism (paragraph 9), to strengthen partnership and cooperation within the UN in order to increase the effectiveness of its activities in the new world realities, to strengthen its central role in ensuring peace and stability, and18. A common thread through the Declaration is the idea of equality of all subjects of international politics and rejection of the format of a unipolar world, although this term itself is not used.
During a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indonesian President S. B. Yudhoyono in Moscow on December 1, 2006, the two heads of State reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of this Declaration as a valuable guide for strategic cooperation between Russia and Indonesia. A number of agreements on cooperation in the legal, military-technical, space, trade and economic fields were signed.19
The visit of the President of the Russian Federation to Jakarta on September 6, 2007 was marked by the signing of a number of documents that noted the convergence of positions of the two countries on major international issues. Indonesia was granted a $1 billion loan. for 15 years to purchase military equipment in Russia, including Su fighters and helicopters of various modifications, equipment for existing equipment. (It is characteristic that after 4 months, in February 2008, US Secretary of Defense R. Gates, during a visit to Jakarta, announced the US readiness to modernize the 4 F-16 fighters available in the country and deliver 6 more such aircraft.)
During Vladimir Putin's visit, documents were also signed on economic cooperation, in particular in the field of oil exploration and production (Lukoil and Indonesia's Pertamina), on the construction of a bauxite-alumina complex (Rusal and Aneka Tambang). It was reported that Russian businesses intend to invest about $10 billion in Indonesia.20
When assessing these impressive figures, it should be borne in mind that economic agreements were reached before the global crisis began and in almost all cases are subject to specification and possible adjustments. Russian-Indonesian relations in general will remain the subject of active and fierce competition both on the part of third countries and various groups in Indonesia itself. As of 2008, the volume of Russian investment in Indonesia was about $4 billion, and the volume of bilateral trade in 2007, although it increased compared to the previous year, did not reach $1 billion.21
Indonesia's foreign policy at almost all its stages was based largely on the use of geopolitical contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia (the fact that these contradictions at a certain stage took on an ideological connotation does not change the situation in principle).
The global crisis, which showed that America is not omnipotent, the arrival of a new administration in the United States, which caused a certain euphoria in Indonesia, may seem to have created a somewhat new situation in this sense.
To what extent these changes will be sustained, time will tell, as well as what impact these changes will have on Indonesia's foreign policy. However, there are sufficient grounds to say that the self-awareness of the Indonesian nation and its historical experience will encourage Indonesia to maintain its policy of diversifying its external relations. What place we will take in these relations will depend on Russia itself, on strengthening its economic and political potential.
Efimova L. M. 1 Stalin and Indonesia. Soviet policy towards Indonesia in 1945-1953 Unknown Pages, Moscow, MGIMO-University. 2004, p. 30.
2 Ibid., pp. 147-151.
3 Cit. by: Hatta M. Dasar Politik Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. Djakarta, 1953. P. 21.
Hatta M. 4 Op. cit., p. 27.
Sholmov Yu. A. 5 Russia - Indonesia. Years of rapprochement and close cooperation (1945-1965). Moscow, IV RAS, 2009, p.181.
6 Ibid., p. 183.
Chernobay G. K. 7 Chief Adviser // Top secret, 1995, No. 11; Chubshev E. K. Nashi v Zapadnom Irian [Nashi in the Western Irian]. Voin Rossii, 1999, No. 4.
Zhdankin A. 8 Three hours before the Third World War. MIC, 2008, N 46.
9 Harian Rakjat (Djakarta), 18.08.1964.
10 These documents were later included in two collections " In Defense of the Fighters against Reaction and Imperialism. To the events in Indonesia", published by the Novosti Press Agency in 1967 and 1969. in Russian and some foreign languages.
Isaakson Walter. 11 Kissinger. A Biography. N.Y., L.e.a., Simon&Shuster. 1992, p. 680 - 681.
Brutents K. N. 12 The unfulfilled. Non-indifferent Notes on Perestroika, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [International Relations]. 2005, p. 221.
13 Kompas (Djakarta), 13.03.1992.
Lee Kuan Yu 14 Singapore history. From the "third world" to the first. Moscow, 2005, p. 262.
15 Today, 27.07.1997.
16 International Herald Tribune, 15.07. 2002.
17 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.09.2000.
18 Information Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation dated 22.04.2003.
19 Message from the Russian Presidential press service "On the visit of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Russia".
20 South-East Asia. Actual problems of development. Issue XI. Moscow, IV RAS, 2008, pp. 110-111.
21 Bulletin of the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in the Russian Federation Tanah Air, November 2008.
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